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Abstract: The European Economic Community's third enlargement round brought up a series of tensions 
between member states, which would require a great amount of time and effort to be solved. Bigger 
issues,  such  as  the  British  contribution,  the  community  budget  and  the  Common  Agriculture  Policy 
reforms, are going to be at the centre of EEC's agenda in the 1970-80's, and ultimately, British and French 
national interests on these matters will prevail. The basic argument of this article is that member states 
used the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, such as improvements in decision-
making procedures and budget reform, and only after those accomplishments, member states agreed on 
concluding the third enlargement.  
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I. Introduction  
 
During  its  first  decade,  the  EEC  (European  Economic  Community),  mainly  driven  by  the 
enthusiastic leadership of Walter Hallstein, President of the European Commission, was successful and 
achieved several goals
2. In the 1970's, however, the EEC would be  confronted with an international 
economic system in profound change, the consequences of the first oil crisis, national protectionism and 
the impact of the first enlargement, which would alter the way the EEC, its institutions and member 
states, would thereafter act. 
It will be within the framework of a Community  in change,  in which  “Eurosclerosis  and 
Europessimism summarize the history of European integration in the mid-70ˮ
3, that would last through 
the first years of the 1980's, that the third or Iberian's accession negotiations will arise. 
Enlargement  has  been  a  major  policy  area,  sometimes  the  most  visible  one,  and  has  enable 
community  growth.  At  the  moment,  there  are  some  more  states
4  on the queue, besides Turkey that 
remains the eternal candidate, and Croatia which already signed the accession treaty last December and 
will join on July 2013. Six enlargement rounds later, this article assesses what were EEC member states' 
responses to membership candidates for the third enlargement round – Portugal and Spain – in the 1980's, 
based on research made at the HAUE (Historical Archives of the European Union) in Florence and at the 
AHCE (Archives of the Council of the European Union) in Brussels, which adds value to research on this 
subject.  
My basic argument is that the EEC was caught up by surprise in the mid 1970's by the wave of 
democratization  occurred  on  the  south  European  countries  and  that,  at  the  time,  another  round  of 
enlargement was not a top priority for the EEC, but even so the prospect of enlargement gave way to 
community internal reforms and to member states' gains, which used enlargement on their own personal 
advantage. 
 
II. The EU and Enlargement 
 
European integration analysis is incomplete if we fail to bring in enlargement policy, which has 
been  intermingled  with  the  theoretical  debates  about  it
5. Enlargements have engaged many years of 
EEC/European Union's
6 (EU) life and have accompanied the EU almost as a permanent item on the 
agenda.  
Since the 1970's that the EU has grown in number of member states: from six in the 1950's it has 
now 27 members and counting. Meanwhile, enlargement studies became a  new area of study
7, but 
literature has focused on some enlargements, such as the first
8 (1973) or the biggest
9 one (2004).  
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At the moment, there is still no systematic study about the Portuguese accession negotiations to 
the EEC, which can, somehow, be related to the archives' “30 year rule”
10. Nevertheless, there are some 
studies about Portugal and the EEC and their relationship
11; about Spain's accession, even conditioned by 
the same constraints, its study is more developed
12.  
If, on one hand, enlargement h as been “the most important issue that the European Union has 
faced”
13, on the other, it was, until the end of the Cold War, “ a sporadic event for much of the EU's 
history”
14, and it wasn't a “particularly popular” one
15. 
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier distinguish four main dimensions of enlargement, 
which  are:  (1)  applicants'  enlargement  politics;  (2)  member  state  enlargement  politics;  (3)  EU 
enlargement politics; and (4) the impact of enlargement
16. This article focus mainly on the second and last 
one – member state's enlargement politics and its impact –, by asserting what makes a state support or 
reject an accession application, its political and economic gains and losses.  
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III. The Third or Iberian Enlargement  
 
It was only in 1973, sixteen years after the establishment of the European Economic Community, 
that it had its first enlargement
17. However, it took only two more years until a new round of accession 
requests would be presented. In a year and a half – from April 24, 1974 until November 20, 1975 –, the 
three southern European dictatorship regimes were overturned, and it would take little time until all turn 
themselves  towards  the  EEC,  which  was,  somehow,  caught  up  by  surprise  by  this  wave  of 
democratization occurred on the south European countries.  
With the overturn of the authoritarian regimes in southern Europe, Portugal, Greece and Spain 
will initiate their path towards democracy. However, it will take some time until a minimum degree of 
democratic consolidation to take place. The EEC followed the political developments happening in those 
countries with attention and concern and from the start that confined economic assistance and political 
support  to  the establishment  of  a  democratic  regime.  Only  democratic  countries  could,  first, receive 
economic and financial assistance, and then become member states.  
The arguments presented to request accession were essentially two: democratic stabilization and 
economic  development.  After  the  first  enlargement,  the  support  of  democracy  became  a  publicly 
acknowledged aim of the EEC
18 and both Portugal and Spain used that to their favor. Unlike Kissinger 
and the United States of America, which defended that a communist regime in South ern Europe would 
teach some lessons, the EEC saw in democracy support a security issue, a way to defend itself. In the end, 
one can even argue that the third enlargement round was accomplished for European security reasons
19. 
In Portugal, Greece and Spain progresses towards democracy were being made
20  and that pleased 
the EEC, whose representatives assume their commitment towards it. On the other hand, it was clear that 
rejecting an application from those three countries would “stimulate the Communist forces evidently alive 
in  each  of  them”
21,  fact  which  determines  that  the  reasons  underlying  both  the  second  and  third 
enlargement rounds were political, both for the applicants countries as for the member states
22. Future 
EEC's membership was thus considered as “a reward for democratization”
23. 
If it was important for the EEC to have democratic regimes in Southern Europe, and both member 
states and EEC representatives assume their commitment towards it, it would have economic costs and 
interfere with how the EEC was established in the 1980's, especially from an economic point of view. In 
1976, still Portugal and Spain had not presented their accession requests, it was recognized that “the 
                                                           
17 The history of EEC's enlargements begins with the Irish accession request made at 31
st July 1961, followed by 
similar requests  made by Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom. The main question raised  was 
whether  states  had  to  hand  over  a  part  of  their  sovereignty  in  favor  of  a  supranational  organization,  thus  the 
resistance  to  a  formal  commitment  with  such  an  organization  as  the  EEC,  even  though  it  had  very  appealing 
economic benefits.  
18 MILWARD, A. S., Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 24 
19 LOPES, E. R., “Depoimento”, in TEIXEIRA, N.S. e PINTO, A.C., Portugal e a Integração Europeia 1945-1986 
– A Perspectiva dos Actores, Temas e Debates, Lisboa, 2007, p. 158 
20 COMMISSION (1978),  Bulletin of the European Communities, No.5, Brussels, Commission of the European 
Communities, p. 7 
21 SEERS, D., “Introduction: The Second Enlargement in Historical Perspective”, in SEERS, D. and VAITSOS, C., 
The Second Enlargement of the EEC – The Integration of Unequal Partners, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982, 
pp. 6-7 
22 VAITSOS, C., “Conclusions: Economic Effects of the Second Enlargement”, in SEERS, D. and VAITSOS, C., 
op. cit., p. 243 
23  EDWARDS, G. and WALLACE, W.,  A  Wider  European  Community?  –  Issues  and  Problems  of  Further 
Enlargement, Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 1976, p. 30 7 
 
relative homogeneity of the Community will be decreased as countries with developing economies are 
included”
24. 
 
          Table I. Key-dates on the second and third enlargement rounds 
Candidate  Demand  for 
Accession 
Beginning  of 
negotiations 
Signature  of  the 
Accession Treaty 
Accession 
Greece  12/06/1975  27/07/1976  28/05/1979  01/01/1981 
Portugal  28/03/1977  17/10/1978  12/06/1985  01/01/1986 
Spain  28/07/1977  05/02/1979  12/06/1985  01/01/1986 
 
 
By  1978,  when  the  three  candidates  were  at  different  stages  in  the  accession  process
25, the 
Commission sends a communication to the  Council  –  “General  Considerations  on  the  Problems  of 
Enlargement”  –  where  it  presents  the  economic  difficulties
26  and institutional problems posed by 
enlargement
27.  
In the 1980's, the EEC had not only a high level of economic development, but its structures also 
were comparatively homogeneous. Greece, Portugal and even Spain (which had more economic growth 
potential), on the other hand, were less economically developed countries and if they became member 
states they would enhance the already existing difficulties in some regions and economic sectors. Besides 
that, the existing agricultural and industrial structures in all three countries were far different from those 
of the member states.  
  The concern that enlargement could jeopardize the EEC economic accomp lishments and the 
cohesion of the common market was real; the fear that it could also weaken it and therefore question its 
fundamental aims was also existent
28. However, there were indeed few grounds for refusing membership 
to the three applicants. In spite of that, one could not underestimate the ability of member states to delay 
any enlargement process, as would be proven by the Iberian enlargement.  
It was acknowledged that Spain's economy was relatively small in comparison with the EEC's, 
which could suggest that Spanish membership would not present major difficulties. This was not, 
however, the case, since that Spain competes most efficiently with the EEC in a number of areas. 
Furthermore, its economy was developing well, enjoying competition conditions,  which privileged its 
expansion. On the other hand, one must recognize a certain structural weakness in Spanish companies to 
what concerns size, productivity and technology.  
The accession negotiations started for Portugal at the 17
th October 1978 and a few months later, at 
the  5
th  of  February  1979,  for  Spain.  Roy  Jenkins,  when  it  came  to  negotiations,  asserted  “that  the 
Commission will do everything in their power to lead to a rapid and successful conclusionˮ, bearing in 
mind “an agreement satisfactory to both partiesˮ; he warned, however, for the many difficulties that had 
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25 At that time, Greece was negotiating at a very good rhythm, which predicted that Greece's accession could take 
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26 It makes a more complete analysis on agriculture, industry, energy, social and regional aspects. 
27  COMMISSION,  “General  Considerations  on  the  Problems  of  Enlargement”  (Communication  sent  by  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  on  20  April  1978),  in  Bulletin  of  the  European  Communities,  Supplement  1/78, 
Luxembourg, European Communities, 1978 [COM (78) 120 final] 
28 COMMISSION, op. cit.  8 
 
to be overcome before integration
29. By then, it was useless to pretend, that Spain's accession would pose 
no problems. As Carlos Closa and Paul Heywood argue “the Spanish accession was a challenge for the 
EU member states, due not only to its size, but also because of the lack of complementary between the 
Spanish and the member states economy”
30.  
  While Greece's accession negotiations lasted for only two years, the Portuguese and Spanish 
ones, lasted for six/seven years. Whereas a good personal relationship between Karamanlis and Giscard 
d'Estaing  speeded  up  Greece's  negotiations  and  made  it  easier  to  accomplish  accession,  there  was 
“considerable  latent  opposition  within  the  Community  to  Iberian  enlargement.  France  was  the  most 
hostile,  while  the  Benelux  countries  were  reluctant,  and  Italy  uncomfortably  thorn  between  Latin 
solidarity and the rivalries of Mediterranean agriculture”
31. As Loukas Tsoukalis
32 points out “the rhetoric 
on Western democratic ideals gradually gave way to heated discussions about the price of peaches and 
olive oil”. 
In  June  1980,  the  first  phase  of  negotiations,  vue  d'ensemble,  had  not  yet  been  completed. 
Portugal and Spain instigated the EEC that it had to be concluded before summer holidays, starting the 
second phase, the actual negotiations, in autumn. The Commission agreed and felt that the “timingˮ to 
finish its work was possible, but the Council (= member states) did not commit to deadlines
33.  
The perspective of enlargement brought up a series of tensions between member states, that 
would require a great amount of time and effort to be over and done. As Thomas Pedersen
34 argues, the 
EU's enlargement policy has become politicized and remains above all a “key political process”
35, which 
makes  that  “the  most lengthy  and  arduous  part  of the  negotiations  is  not the  accession  negotiations 
between the Union and the applicant countries at ministerial or ambassadorial level, but the internal 
discussions of the Union itself”
36. 
Bigger  issues,  such  as  the  British  contribution,  the  community  budget  and  the  Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) reform, are going to be at the centre of the EEC's agenda in the 1980's. And 
ultimately, the British and French national interests on these matters will prevail.  
 
IV. The barriers to overcome 
 
There was an EEC's commitment to implement structural reforms as a key requirement to meet its 
internal and external obligations related to enlargement
37, arguing that the expansion and strengthening of 
                                                           
29 AHCE, CONF-P/4/78, “Declaration made by Mr. Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission of the European 
Communities  at  the  opening  ministerial  session  of  the  negotiations  between  the  European  Communities  and 
Portugal, further to Portugal's application to accede to those Communities, held in Luxembourg on 17 October 
1978”, p. 2 
30 CLOSA, C. and HEYWOOD, P. M., op. cit., p. 21 
31 JENKINS, R., European Diary, 1977-1981, Collins, London, 1989, pp. 199-200 
32  TSOUKALIS, L.,  The  European  Community  and  its  Mediterranean  Enlargement,  George  Allen  &  Unwin, 
London, 1981, p. 136 
33 AHCE, BAC 250/1980 n.º5, “Note de Dossier – Situation des Négociations avec l'Espagne et le Portugal après 
des sessions de n￩gociations du 6.6.1980 et perspectives du d￩roulement futur”, 16 juin 1980 
34 PEDERSEN, T., European Union and the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Integration, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
London, 1994, p. 138 
35 SCHIMMELFENNIG, F. and SEDELMEIER, U., op. cit., p. 3 
36 AVERY, G. and CAMERON, F., op.cit., p. 31 
37 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, “European Union – Reports for 1980”, in Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 4/80, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1981 9 
 
common  policies  must  be  pursued  in  parallel  and  simultaneously,  but  the  former  cannot  ever  be  a 
condition to the later
38. 
Negotiations with Portugal and Spain were now being conducted on the same basis than those of 
Greece and even those of the first enlargement and the concerns were also the same as that for the first 
widening: the need to strengthen the EEC before enlarging it. 
Thus,  in  parallel  with  the  negotiations ,  there  was  a  need   to  expand  and   refocus  certain 
Community  instruments  (particularly  in  agricultural  and  financial  sectors )  to  deal  with  the  three  
accessions (e.g., regional and social funds), to ensure that there will actually occur a considerable transfer 
of resources to the south of the EEC, so that future  member states might receive everything they can 
absorb
39.  
However, in this case, member states did not consider enlargement as an opportunity to enhance 
reforms, but rather “a source of misunderstanding about major policy issues and as an obstacle to further 
development of the Community in general”
40. And there were other difficulties. As Desmond Dinan
41 
mentions, “EC's problems were a legion”, including among them “a paralyzed decision-making process, a 
weak Commission, an agricultural policy seemingly out of control, a new French president (François 
Mitterrand)  and  a  new  British  prime  minister  (Margaret  Thatcher)  who  insisted  on  a  budget 
compensation, a subject that dominated the next five years and the following fifteen summits”, which 
made that accession negotiations got involved on this ongoing negotiation between the member states
42. 
 
The UK contribution to the budget 
 
In  the  1980's,  an  important  issue  that  influenced  the  course,  or  rather,  the  non-political 
advancement of the negotiations with Portugal and Spain was the British contribution to the budget. 
With the fall of the Conservative government of Edward Heath in 1974, and the come-to-office of 
the Labour Party, led by Harold Wilson, which did not agree with the British accession clauses, the EEC 
was immediately “confronted with the thorny issue of the British budget contribution”
43. 
In 1976, the UK was then the third largest net contributor to the community budget (Germany and 
Belgium) and the following year it was the second, just behind Germany. Even with the renegotiation and 
the transitional provisions, the situation remained. It was expected that once the transitional period was 
finished by 1980, the UK would became the largest net contributor. Such situation was due to: (1) the UK 
imported more goods outside the EEC than the other member states, so it paid more taxes on imports; (2) 
low rates of consumption meant that British consumers used more than the country's wealth, which meant 
that the country would contribute with more VAT for the Community budget; (3) off-budget, payments 
were dominated by CAP and the UK had a small agricultural sector and therefore received less than other 
member  states  which  had  larger  agricultural  economies.  The  problem  was  not,  however,  on  the 
contribution the UK made to the EEC, but the amount it received in return
44.  
                                                           
38 AHCE, BAC 250/1980 n.° 64, "Briefing Note for President Jenkins, Venice Summit Meeting: Enlargement  – 
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Two years earlier, in 1974, the renegotiation of the accession clauses was almost finished when 
the leaders of the Community mandated the Commission to create a “corrective mechanismˮ that would 
prevent the United Kingdom or any other member state to contribute too much to the EEC's budget. At 
the summit in Dublin (10-11 March 1975), it was decided to reimburse the UK. Months later, at the 
Dublin European Council (29-30 November 1979), Margaret Thatcher, elected meanwhile, did not accept 
the Commission's proposal to repay 350 million pounds; she wanted one million, maintaining her position 
during the following four and a half years; in this period of four/five years several temporary “cutsˮ were 
agreed, but no final agreement was reached, so the UK would begin to obstruct the progress in other 
areas, until its claim was accepted. 
By this particular case, it began to be clear that  the political rhetoric in favor of democratic 
consolidation in Southern Europe and the accession of candidate countries was giving way to the proper 
and immediate interests of the member states. 
 
Institutional Reform 
 
In the early 1970's, the institutions created by the Treaty of Rome indicated several weaknesses. 
To this regard, it was the hypothesis of enlargement that gave the final stimulus needed for institutional 
reform, because the prospect of enlargement came at a time when Community institutions were in need of 
reform
45. 
Previously, the “Tindemans Report”
46 already enclosed a section devoted to institutional reform, 
in  which  Leo  Tindemans  argues  that  the  institutional  basis  as  enshrined  in  the  treaties  should  be 
maintained, since it improves the performance of institutions, whose authority was being deteriorated, 
which reflected itself in later decisions. After analyzing each institution, some recommendations were 
delivered, among which are considered the enrichment of the role of the European Council and of the 
European Parliament, the extent of use of majority voting, the coordination of Council activities, greater 
influence and cohesion of the Commission and the delegation of executive power. 
The  European  Commission  itself  acknowledges  that  “the  strengthening  of  the  European 
institutional  system  must  be  pursued  in  the  future,  especially  taking  into  account  the  predictable 
consequences  of  enlargement”
47  and  its  president  supports  that  “the  impact  of  enlargement  on  the 
institutions, originally designed for six countries, seeking to accommodate nine, should be scrutinized” 
arguing that “the Community has to strengthen itself in order to support the future expansion”
48. 
Basically,  it  was  a  common  understanding  that  enlargement  would  led  to  
EEC's  “development  and  not  to  dilution”,  which  implied  “the  development  of  common  policies, 
institutions' strengthening and the improvement of political cooperation”
49. 
This issue will be specifically placed in the context of enlargement in more than one occasion
50, 
because  the deterioration  of institutions  was at risk , and ther e was no assurance   that  the present 
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institutional system would ensure an efficient decision-making process in an enlarged community, which 
had already occurred earlier in the transition from six to nine member states.  
Thus, in the early 1980's, there was not only the perception but also the agreement to carry out 
institutional reforms, in order to make the decision process easier and more effective
51. But this was still 
the beginning, dragging it until the conclusion of the accession negotiations and even beyond, ending only 
in 1986 with the signing of the Single European Act. 
 
 
Negotiations’ stops and starts 
 
Since  its  beginning  the  negotiations  remained  slow.  Attilio  Ruffini,  the  Council's  President, 
expressed the wish that the main problems were defined so that practical solutions could be found
52, but 
between desires and achievements the road is long and sometimes winding. However, accession meetings 
continued
53. At the Luxembourg European Council (27-28 April 1980), no agreement was reached on the 
main subject on the agenda, the British contribution. It was then evident the lack of community cohesion 
and enthusiasm. 
After a new year, the European Community changes with a new European Commission  and a 
new President, Gaston Thorn, taking office, from January 6, 1981 to January 5, 1985
54, period which will 
almost match with the remaining length of the negotiations. Political progresses were, however, scarce. 
Gathered at the Luxembourg European Council (29-30 June 1981), the Heads of State and Government 
did not go further on enlargement, since the main discussion subject was  the  economic and social 
situation, besides restructuring EEC's budget. By then, not only the UK had problems with the budget, but 
also  Helmut Schmidt did not accept that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)  was the only net 
contributor to EEC's budget. 
Until then, the prospect of new members  did not pose special difficulties for France. That will, 
however, change starting June 5, 1980, with the abrupt and sudden change of attitude of Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing. A year later, the French government  presented to the other Member States and the European 
institutions,  the  “M￩morandum  sur  la  Relance  Europ￩enne”
55,  which  suggests  the  consolidation  and 
development of common policies, the improvement of EEC functioning and institutional cooperation, so 
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that there could happen a European relaunch. This is the “official” statement; yet, the coming up of 
French elections and the “need” to please French farmers was the main reason behind this pause
56. 
Between May 1981 and the end of the following year, French position had two axes: to impose its 
views to its partners and to make Portugal and Spain wait, until suitable solutions to the problems posed 
by enlargement were found,   so not to  repeat the  Greek experience
57,  which ironically joined  on  the 
conditions that joined because of the French patronage,   under the motto  “join  first,  negotiate  later”. 
Moreover, in this period, French position will be characterized by the refusal to initiate the most sensitive 
chapters,  and  to  establish  any  future  date  for  accession
58,  a  position  which  will  not  be  shaken.  
Nevertheless, the French  knew that they could not indefinitely postpone the negotiations, so slowly, it 
began to progress. 
The delay  or  interruption  in the negotiations  could have  dire  political consequences  for the 
applicant countries. On the other hand, delays, or even discontinuation of the enlargement process, might 
contribute to public opinion in applicant countries to weaken their views on democracy and European 
ideals, assigning responsibility to the EEC
59, so it was a two face game, equally dangerous. 
Although, by this time, much of the initial commitment by member states had disappeared, and a 
decline in political will to make a success of enlargement was obvious, negotiations continued. More by 
habit than by will. 
In spring 1982 the internal crisis  led EEC, lacking a sense of direction  in the formulation of 
Community policies, to the brink of paralysis, in an attempt to deal simultaneously with several problems. 
Later that year, the Council asked the Commission to work on an inventory
60  on  issues  related to 
enlargement, regarding both common policies and individual implications for each member state
61, which 
resulted on a new document called “Problems of Enlargement – Taking Stock and Proposals”, whose 
content revealed the existing obstacles concerning enlargement. It divides the obstacles in two categories: 
internal and thrown up by negotiations, with more detailed analysis on four sectors (agriculture, fisheries, 
industry and budgetary matters). 
At the end of the year, during Copenhagen European Council (3-4 December 1982), Danish 
Prime-minister Poul Schlüter reaffirmed the EEC's political commitment in favor of enlargement and 
welcomed  the  Commission's  Inventory,  which  itself  was  a  breakthrough  in the  enlargement  process, 
defining the way for the accession process
62. The Council also recommended that the Commission should 
explore with the candidates the possibility to introduce internal measures before accession in order to 
prepare their economy, especially on the most sensitive sectors. 
But domestic reform was stopped: CAP reform and the financing of the EEC, particularly in view 
of the contribution of the member states had threatened, more than once, the decision process, which, in 
turn, threatened the negotiations. 
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New year, old business. Early in 1983, on January 23, the Commission adopted amendments to 
rules related to fruits, vegetables and olive oil, as well as the guidelines of the integrated Mediterranean 
programs; and also focuses again on institutional issues
63. 
Months went by, when another development came along; it was nothing practical, just another 
wishful intention from member states to solve their own proble ms and look for their own particular 
interests: the “Stuttgart Mandate”, which had the mission of launching negotiations to resolve financial 
problems related to the third enlargement. 
Meanwhile, Greece would hold the rotating Council presidency for the first time, in the second 
half of 1983. Few days before holding the presidency, Andhréas Papandhréou said to be in favor of 
membership, although he had reservations
64. It will be during this presidency that a breaking point is 
going to occur: after more than four years of negotiations, finally “the heart” of negotiations is reached – 
agriculture. One by one the lesser issues had been exceeded, and then “the decisive moment for the 
negotiations  on  the  agriculture  chapter  would  be  reached  in  the  spring  of  1984  during  the  French 
Presidency,  in  which  Mitterrand  would  be  called  upon  to  decide  between  the  claims  of  farmers  in 
southern France or veto the nominations of two southern European statesˮ
65. 
On October an agreement on Mediterranean products was reached, which was considered the 
overturn  of  a  major  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  negotiations.  Enlargement,  nevertheless,  was  not  a 
technical issue, it was of political nature. 
Athens European Council Meeting (6 December 1983), whose main purpose was to implement 
the resolutions of the Stuttgart Mandate (increase financial resource, place a limit on spending and set a 
ceiling on agricultural surpluses), was a failure, which, in turn, led to no progress on enlargement. After 
the Athens' failure, on the next Council meeting (Brussels, 19-20 March 1984) it was still not possible to 
reach an agreement on the correction of the British contribution to the European budget. By that time, 
member states agreed on encouraging negotiations in order to conclude them on September 1984
66, which 
would not happen until Community's own resources could be raised.  
At this point, France's attitude on linking enlargement  to the restructuring  of the financial 
structures of the Community was regarded as seeking “a dual purpose: to use the application of the two 
Iberian countries as a pretext to impose on other members of the EEC a certain mode of operation of the 
EEC”
67. 
It would be only at Fontainebleau (25-26 June 1984), that an agreement on the compensation 
amount for the UK would be reached: this agreement allows the execution of two others, namely the 
increase of own resources, with a maximum 1.4% VAT (Value Added Tax) and financial and budgetary 
discipline
68.  
With the British problem solved, François Mitterrand speaks on an EEC's “vigorous rebound”
69 
and Gaston Thorn noted that afterward, to what concerns enlargement, “everything is possible, but not 
everything is guaranteed”
70. 
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Eight  days before  the summit  in  Fontainebleau, the EEC, Portugal  and Spain had reached a 
framework agreement as to particular sectors, fact that generated a certain euphoria, which materialized at 
the  summit  with  the  definition  of  the  accession  date.  In  fact,  the  European  Council  meeting  at 
Fontainebleau “marked a turning point in European integration”
71, by solving the British budgetary issue, 
thus ending five years of wrangling and paved the way for CAP's reform. 
The Fontainebleau's conclusions established September 30, 1984 as the deadline to conclude 
negotiations, an engagement all European partners knew that cannot be met
72. Nevertheless, Mitterrand 
went to Lisbon and Madrid to personally give the good news of the Spanish and Portuguese accession. 
Yet, at the same time, negotiations were blocked by disagreements between member states, which 
saw a double threat in enlargement: threat to Community's finances and to some of its economic sectors, 
especially agriculture and fisheries
73. 
Just like in the 1970's, the Commission looked for a role for itself
74. Altogether, the Commission 
had a secondary role in the negotiation, when it comes to taking decisions, but it was the only institution 
that accompanied the applicant countries all the way and that had always a positive approach. From the 
outside, one can think that it is the Commission in fact that conducts negotiations, which is a wrong 
perception, since enlargement requires a unanimous decision by the European Council members, which 
dictated, along the way the time and conditions by which enlargement would be accomplished. And even 
they did not show the same attitude towards enlargement: enthusiastic at first, they soon became aware of 
the sort of questions involved and “weren't so generous and enthusiastic”
75 thereafter.  
The Italian Presidency, starting January 1985, began with the firm intention that the treaty would 
be signed during its presidency, so it redoubled efforts, especially through its Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Giulio Andreotti. At this stage, negotiations were to reach its political climax. They could not continue 
indefinitely and had to be completed in March
76. 
  Even so, and as for Spain, when both delegations were about to finish the remaining chapters, on 
the evening of the 21
st of March, France had a last minute question about wine quotas and fishing boats
77. 
In François Duchêne's
78 opinion “the French, whose leaders originally saw Spain as a reinforcement of 
France's central position in the Community between the German and Latin worlds, have now realised that 
there are in fact many potential rivalries across the Pyrenees”, mostly from an economic point of view.  
In spite of this last minute divergence, a political agreement regarding enlargement was obtained 
on the night of 28 to 29 March: “it was 3:15 a.m. when the marathon session ended. As bleary-eyed 
foreign ministers spilled out of the 14
th floor conference room atop Brussels' Charlemagne Building, they 
knew that they had just made history”
79. 
Yet, enlargement would be still on hold due to Greece's question on the adoption of the IMP 
(Integrated  Mediterranean  Programme).  Already  after  the  end  of  negotiations,  Greece  revealed  its 
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intention  to  veto  Iberian  countries  accession.  That  intention  was  overcome  with  the  creation  of  the 
Comprehensive Integrated Mediterranean Programme, by which Greece would receive 2000 million ECU 
(European  Currency  Unit).  With  the  IMP  agreement,  the  Greeks  draw  back  their reservation,  which 
showed again the bargaining power of the member states in opposition to candidates.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Both Portugal and Spain accession's requests, entailed a long and complex negotiation process, 
which was not an “easy, short, nor quiet task”
80. What might have appeared, at start, to be a simple and 
fast negotiation, similar to the previous ones
81, ended after almost eight  years of negotiations, in which 
everything interacted with and delayed the Portuguese and Spanish accession. In the end, EEC's accession 
treaties were signed on the 12
th of June 1986, the year that became a turning point in the history of both 
Iberian states and that has allowed more than 25 five years of European community experience
82. 
Enlargement was indeed on the EEC's agenda in the 1980's, but it wasn't by far its main concern. 
Community  budget,  CAP  reform,  the  British reimbursement,  were   main  topics  that  stood  on  the 
Community's agenda alongside with the enlargement. However, until all of these questions were dealt 
with and in a satisfactory manner for all member states, enlargement was stalled.  
Although negotiations were never  formally stopped, they depended on  the resolution of these 
major  community issues.
  Several  European  summits  and  Council  meetings  between  1980-84  were 
dominated  by  the  British  contribution  to  the  community  budget.  No  advances  were  made  regarding 
enlargement,  with  an  intransigent  Margaret  Thatcher  who  demanded  for  to  resolution  of  the  British 
contribution first. 
Even if EEC/EU's history has proven that “enlargement has acted as a stimulus for deepening”
83, 
because it compels institutional changes and the reform of community policies, it was often said that 
enlargement could not put at risk the bases, objectives and cohesion of the Community, nor its future 
development, which might happen if all three south European countries joined the EEC still in the 1970's. 
Still, not all the three candidate had a similar treatment, since Greece had a preferential one. In that sense, 
one can argue that if the EEC gave the same initial positive response to all applicants, it ultimately gave a 
different treatment to each of them, benefiting Greece, and harming Portugal and Spain. 
In the end, French interests prevailed and it was thanks to enlargement that the Mediterranean 
Integrated Programme was established and that France decided in its favor to a political-technical issue 
(social-adjustment derived from economic expansion) that lasted for several years
84. 
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Member  states  used  the  prospect  of  enlargement  to  achieve  particular  policy  goals,  such  as 
improvements  in  decision-making  procedures  and  the  reform  of  CAP,  with  the  European  Council 
determining the time and conditions by which enlargement would become a reality. As former European 
Commission president Roy Jenkins
85 stated, “the formal process of decision is reasonably well known. 
The  Commission  proposes;  the  Council  disposes”,  which  was  exactly  what  happened  regarding  the 
Iberian enlargement.  
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